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HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: ACHIEVING MORE JUST RESULTS IN 
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES BY RE-
EXAMINING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
ELISABETH A. KELLER AND JUDITH B. TRACY* 
ABSTRACT 
Lower federal courts often fail to provide plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases 
the relief intended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and mandated by 
the Supreme Court when it recognized the cause of action twenty years ago.  
There is little doubt that sexual harassment in the workplace persists.  However, 
lower courts misapply or ignore Supreme Court reasoning that would result in 
fairer and more consistent dispositions in hostile work environment sexual 
harassment cases.  This article draws directly on reasoning from the Supreme 
Court cases to explain the sources of the confusion in the lower courts and offers 
jury instructions and guidelines to judges that reflect what the Supreme Court 
intended. 
A female deputy sheriff alleged that, in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, she was sexually harassed by another officer in the County 
Sheriff’s Department where they worked.1  The co-worker’s harassing behavior 
included, among other acts, his comment to the deputy that “you can just walk 
into the room and I get an erection;” his calling the deputy a “frigid bitch” on 
two occasions, once when he tried to kiss her after a department Christmas 
party, and another time when she refused to join him in a hot tub at a hotel 
where they both were attending a conference; his telling her that “her ass sure 
does look fine;” and his descriptions to her and others of a golf tournament 
where the caddies were strippers and they were directed “to place golf balls into 
their vaginas and to squirt them onto the green.”2 
The federal district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.  
In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
 
 * Associate Professors, Legal Reasoning, Research & Writing, Boston College Law School.  We 
are grateful for the support provided by the Boston College Law School Fund and wish to thank our 
students and colleagues for their encouragement and advise.  We particularly appreciate the 
thoughtful reactions and suggestions provided by Associate Dean Michael Cassidy and Professors 
Ray Madoff and Mark S. Brodin.  We also owe special thanks for the substantial contributions of 
Research Assistants Evan White, Haven Perkins, Will Saxe, Nicholas Soivilien, and Michelle 
Ellwood. 
 1. Mitchell v. Pope, 189 F.App’x 911, 913 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 2. Id. at 914 n.3. 
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decision, stating that the conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
constitute actionable sexual harassment.3 
INTRODUCTION 
This brief description of a 2006 disposition represents one of many 
decisions in which courts have unreasonably ruled that plaintiffs could not 
establish the existence of a hostile work environment caused by sexual 
harassment.4  There are numerous examples of cases in which summary 
judgments for defendants have been improperly granted or verdicts for 
plaintiffs have been vacated.5  There is widespread agreement by scholars that 
even twenty years after the recognition by the Supreme Court of the cause of 
action for hostile work environment sexual harassment, there is a failure to 
provide the relief intended under Title VII and mandated by the Court.6 
“Sexual harassment in American worklife is [common-place] – [affecting] 
as [many] as 80 percent of women in certain sectors, according to one study.  But 
most women don’t stand a chance of winning a lawsuit.”7  There seems little 
doubt that sexual harassment in the workplace persists and has measurable and 
 
 3. Id. at 914−15. 
 4. In Part III, three particularly illustrative cases are discussed in depth. 
 5. See generally Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 
34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999); M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and 
Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311 (1999); Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, 
The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548 (2001) (examining every federal district 
and appellate court decision involving workplace sexual harassment from 1986−95, determining 
which plaintiffs were more likely to be successful). 
 6. See generally DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. 
Siegel eds., 2004); Vicki Schultz, Understanding Sexual Law in Action: What Has Gone Wrong and What 
Can We Do About It, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1 (2006); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual 
Harassment, 107 YALE L. J. 1683 (2003); Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What 
Judges and Reasonable People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791 (2002); Eric Schnapper, 
Some of Them Still Don’t Get It: Hostile Work Environment Litigation in the Lower Courts, 1999 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 277 (1999); Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual 
Harassment to be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62 
MD. L. REV. 85 (2003); Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1169 (1998); Debra D. Burke, Workplace Harassment: A Proposal for a Bright-Line Test Consistent 
with the First Amendment, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 591 (2004). 
 7. BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 2006, at G1 (the word “pervasive” was replaced in the text with 
“common-place” in order to minimize confusion in the discussion of the legal standard of 
“pervasive”).  This is just one of many accounts of ongoing or increasing incidents of sexual 
harassment in the workplace.  See, e.g., Yvonne Abraham, Unappetizing Behavior, BOSTON GLOBE, July 
29, 2007, at B1 (describing a complaint filed with the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination by an experienced woman bartender who was fired after complaining that her 
manager frequently propositioned women at the bar, commented on his sexual needs and practices, 
and regularly displayed explicit signs and sex toys on her bar, including a mechanical toy that 
simulated intercourse; this restaurant was managed by a company which three years before initially 
did not respond but eventually settled a claim against a manager in another restaurant who was 
charged by four waitresses with, among other things, rubbing up against them, regaling them with 
detailed reviews of pornographic films, and focusing the restaurant’s hidden camera on customers’ 
breasts); Liz Kowalczyk, Woman Details Case Against Haddad, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 2007, at B1 
(reporting on the filing of a complaint against the Caritas hospital chain alleging sexual harassment 
against it and a former chief executive; the former employee stated that the executive had frequently 
kissed and embraced her over a 15−month period). 
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immeasurable impacts on those who are victimized by this form of 
discrimination and on their employers.8 
In 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized a cause of 
action for workers subjected to a hostile work environment created by sexual 
harassment.9  It held that such conduct, when objectively severe or pervasive, 
violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10  However, since then, lower 
courts have not consistently or rationally applied this standard.  This is not the 
result of a failure of the Supreme Court to establish a workable and fair 
standard, nor is it due to an absence of scholarly or judicial analysis of those 
standards.  Nevertheless, troubling and confusing precedent is created and 
followed because too often Supreme Court cases are relied on for only the 
narrowest propositions.  Lower courts ignore or dismiss the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning which would provide the necessary guidance to determine whether 
harassment is severe or pervasive.11 
To address the problem of unreasonable and unfair dispositions denying 
plaintiffs relief, some commentators have suggested solutions requiring a 
change in the law, through legislation, manipulation or abandonment of 
Supreme Court standards,12 or use of social science to determine violations of the 
 
 8. See, e.g., THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTH VERSUS WORKING REALITIES 1 (2005). 
 9. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65−67 (1986). 
 10. Id. at 67; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2003). 
 11. See BEINER, supra note 8, at 20.  Popular media also has addressed the problem of confusing 
application of standards for determining the existence of unlawful sexual harassment.  See, e.g., 
Sacha Pfeiffer, Gray Areas Complicate Sexual Harassment Cases, BOSTON GLOBE, May 25, 2006, at A1 
(“Although most companies have detailed and similar policies against sexual harassment, employers 
often find themselves in murky territory when it comes to defining, proving, and disciplining sexual 
harassment in the workplace.”  Among the complications noted in the article are the need for case-
by-case evaluation of highly fact-specific charges, often turning on determinations of credibility; the 
differing perceptions of the alleged perpetrator and complainant; and workplace circumstances, 
environment, and culture.). 
 12. See, e.g., e. christi cunningham, Preserving Normal Heterosexual Male Fantasy: The “Severe or 
Pervasive” Missed-Interpretation of Sexual Harassment in the Absence of a Tangible Job Consequence, 1999 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 270−72 (1999) (arguing that the severe or pervasive standard is an extension of 
sexual inequality and a new standard should be implemented); Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment 
as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375, 394−99 
(1998) (describing that sexual harassment analysis is too vague and advocating a tort law approach); 
Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The Employers’ Paradox in Responding to Hostile 
Environment Sexual Harassment – A Proposed Way Out, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1533−38, 1594−95 
(1999) (suggesting that the totality of circumstances test should be dropped and internal arbitration 
policies instituted to prevent and respond to sexual harassment).  Some have proposed substituting 
the reasonable person standard with a reasonable woman standard. See, e.g., Leslie M. Kerns, A 
Feminist Perspective: Why Feminists Should Give the Reasonable Woman Standard Another Chance, 10 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L.  195, 196−97, 208−09 (2001); Barbara A. Gutek, et al., The Utility of the 
Reasonable Woman Legal Standard in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases: a Multi-Method, 
Multi-Standard Examination, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 596, 625−26 (1999) ; Nicole Newman, The 
Reasonable Woman: Has She Made a Difference? 27 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 529, 541−42, 555 (2007) (book 
review).  Another proposal suggests that the severe or pervasive standard should be applied as an 
inverse variance test. See, e.g., Joseph M. Pellicciotti, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A 
Consideration of Post-Vinson Approaches Designed to Determine Whether Sexual Harassment is Sufficiently 
Severe or Pervasive, 5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 215, 226 (1993)  There has also been the suggestion that a 
traditional disparate impact analysis should be included within the consideration of whether the 
conduct was severe or pervasive. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 6, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. at 48−50; 
07__KELLER_TRACY.DOC 5/27/2008  2:09:51 PM 
250 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 15:247 2008 
law.13  However, the inability of plaintiffs to win lawsuits14 is not the result of 
unreasonable legal standards set forth by the Supreme Court; rather, it is the 
result of a failure to apply those standards.  Lower courts have ignored the 
direction and guidance of the Supreme Court cases which explained the cause of 
action and detailed how facts are to be evaluated in ruling on claims of hostile 
work environment sexual harassment.  The solution is simple: courts need to 
apply the Supreme Court cases more consistently, providing a fair and workable 
approach to the standards for determining whether alleged conduct in sexual 
harassment cases violates Title VII. 
Part I of this article explores the development of the standards for the 
establishment of a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment, 
particularly the requirement that the conduct be severe or pervasive.  Part II 
identifies several reasons for the confusing and inconsistent application of this 
severe or pervasive standard.  Part III examines three recently litigated cases to 
demonstrate how greater reliance on Supreme Court analysis would have 
resulted in fairer and more reasonable dispositions.  Part IV provides a clear and 
precise approach to the severe or pervasive standard based on an analysis 
synthesizing the reasoning of the Supreme Court.  We suggest the use of this 
approach as model jury instructions or as guidance for judges when considering 
motions for summary judgment.  The proposed analysis should be applied in 
evaluating facts and making case analogies, so that more consistent and rational 
outcomes can be obtained in sexual harassment hostile work environment cases.  
This article’s goal is to offer courts and litigators a practical solution to the 
challenge of interpreting and applying the rather abstract standards of severe or 
pervasive.15  Our analysis would more successfully differentiate “ordinary 
socializing in the workplace”16 from “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 
insult.”17 
 
Schultz, supra note 6, 107 YALE L. J. at 1714−16, 1799−1801; Jamie Lynn Cook, Comment, Bitch v. 
Whore: the Current Trend to Define the Requirements of an Actionable Hostile Environment Claim in Verbal 
Sexual Harassment Cases, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 465, 492− 94 (2000); Laura D. Francis, Note, What 
Part of “Hostile Environment” Don’t You Understand? The Need for an Entire-Environment Approach in 
Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 815, 824−29 (2004). 
 13. BEINER, supra note 8, at 29−45. 
 14. See generally BEINER, supra note 5. 
 15. See Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N. Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 (reporting on a presentation at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in 
which seven judges of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed the decline in reliance 
on law review articles due in part to the failure of such articles to address actual statutes, cases and 
doctrines (Judge Jacobs is quoted as saying “I haven’t opened a law review in years. . . .No one 
speaks of them.  No one relies on them.”  And, to the extent law reviews are cited, Judge Stack stated 
that they are used “more for support than for illumination.”)); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Law Reviews 
vs. the Courts: Two Thoughts from the Ivory Tower, 39 CONN. L. REV. CONNtemplations 1, 2 (Spring 
2007) (supporting the suggestion that at least some legal scholarship should aspire to be useful to 
judges). 
 16. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
 17. Id. at 78. 
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PART I 
In its decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,18 in 1986, the Supreme 
Court held that Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]19, which prohibits, inter 
alia, discrimination based on sex, encompasses a cause of action for sexual 
harassment resulting in the creation of a hostile or abusive work environment.20  
The statute does not prohibit sexual harassment; rather, it prohibits 
discrimination “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment. . .”21  The Court stated that sexual 
harassment is prohibited by Title VII, noting that the statute evinced “a 
congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
men and women’ in employment.”22  The Court quoted from Guidelines issued 
in 1980 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission23 which specified 
that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.24  
The Court also stated that the EEOC Guidelines drew on a substantial body of 
lower court opinions which had already ruled that Title VII encompasses claims 
of a hostile environment based on sexual harassment, just as it recognizes such 
claims based on racial harassment.25 
However, the Court stated that “not all workplace conduct that may be 
described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment 
within the meaning of Title VII.”26  The Court then declared that “[f]or sexual 
harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter 
the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working 
environment.’”27 
 
 18. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer – 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”) 
 20. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65−66 (distinguishing hostile environment sexual harassment from a 
cause of action based on quid pro quo discrimination, which conditions concrete employment benefits 
on sexual favors, and also holding that a plaintiff in a hostile work environment claim need not 
establish economic or tangible harm in order to prevail). 
 21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 22. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702, 707, n.13 (1978)). 
 23. Id. at 65. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is charged under Title VII with 
the responsibility for the administration of the Act and a variety of duties associated with its 
implementation.  See 42 U.S.C. A. § 2000e-4. 
 24. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. The Guidelines enumerate certain types of workplace conduct which 
might be actionable: “Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature[.]”  29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985). 
 25. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66−67; See Johnson, supra note 6, at 122 (noting that the severe or 
pervasive standard is applied in racial harassment cases less stringently than in sexual harassment 
cases). See generally Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me a “Bitch” – Just Don’t Use the “N-Word”: Some 
Thoughts on Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v. Western Southern Life 
Insurance Co., 46 DE PAUL L. REV. 741 (Spring 1997). 
 26. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
 27. Id. (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 904 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
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After concluding that the conduct in Meritor was not only pervasive, but 
“criminal conduct of the most serious nature,” and therefore “plainly sufficient 
to state a claim for ‘hostile environment’ sexual harassment”,28 the Court 
provided somewhat limited additional guidance about how courts should 
determine if conduct was severe or pervasive.29  Again relying on the EEOC 
Guidelines, the Court declared that “the trier of fact must determine the 
existence of sexual harassment in light of the ‘record as a whole’ and ‘the totality 
of circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in 
which the alleged incidents occurred.’”30  The Court stated that “‘mere utterance 
of an . . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee’ would not 
affect the conditions of employment to a significant degree to violate Title VII.”31 
Seven years later, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,32 the Court again 
considered this cause of action.  The Court affirmed the standard in Meritor, 
stating: “When the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule, and insult’ . . . (internal citation omitted). . . that is ‘sufficiently severe 
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an 
abusive working environment’, . . . (internal citation omitted). . . Title VII is 
violated.”33 In Harris, the Court resolved a conflict among the circuits concerning 
the necessity for proving psychological harm or actual injury, declaring that it 
was taking a “middle path between making actionable any conduct that is 
merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological 
injury.”34  It then refined the standard for establishing a hostile work 
environment, holding that conduct must be considered both objectively hostile or 
abusive (if a reasonable person would find it so) and subjectively abusive (as 
experienced by the victim) to prove that the conduct actually altered the 
conditions of the victim’s employment.35 
The Court then stated that the objective test is not and cannot be 
mathematically precise, and affirmed that the totality of circumstances must be 
 
 28. Id. at 60.  The Court stated that respondent testified that the bank manager: forcibly raped 
her on several occasions, had sexual intercourse with her 40 to 50 times, and fondled her; made 
verbal sexual advances towards her, including invitations for sexual relations and demands for 
sexual favors; and followed her into the restroom when she went there alone, and exposed himself 
to her. 
 29. Id. at 68 (noting that the “gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged 
sexual advances were ‘unwelcome’” (citing 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985) and distinguishing this from 
the question of whether the victim’s actual participation was voluntary).  And see Theresa M. Beiner, 
Sexy Dressing Revisited: Does Target Dress Play a Part in Sexual Harassment Cases, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L 
& POL’Y 125, 135−38 (2007) (considering the role of women’s attire in determining whether the 
conduct is considered unwelcome). 
 30. Id. at 69 (quoting 29 CFR § 1604.11(b) (1985)). 
 31. Id. at 67 (quoting Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238, in which the court discussed “an ethnic or racial 
epithet.”). 
 32. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 33. Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  As noted, the focus of this article is on the objective test requirement that the conduct be 
severe or pervasive; therefore, discussion of the standard for satisfying the subjective test is not 
discussed. 
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considered.36  The Court declared: “These [circumstances] may include the 
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”37  The Court 
held that “no single factor is required.”38 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Harris was prescient.  He was concerned that 
the Court did not create a clear standard.39  He commented that although the 
Court listed some factors that contribute to abusiveness, “since it neither says 
how much of each is necessary (an impossible task) nor identifies any single 
factor as determinative, it thereby adds little certitude.”40 “As a practical matter, 
today’s holding lets virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-related 
conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough to 
warrant an award of damages. . . . Be that as it may, I know of no alternative to 
the course the Court has taken. . . .41 
It would not be until 1998 that the Court again addressed the standards to 
be applied to a sexual harassment claim under Title VII.  In Oncale v Sundowner 
Offshore Services, Inc.,42 the Court held that there may be a violation of Title VII’s 
prohibition against discrimination because of sex when the harasser and the 
victim are of the same sex.43  The Court affirmed its earlier ruling that in order to 
establish a violation of Title VII, the conduct must be objectively severe or 
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment.44 
The Court, in the opinion authored by Justice Scalia, then provided analysis 
directed at the determination of whether conduct could be considered severe, 
expanding on the explanation in Harris of what is to be considered when 
objectively viewing the totality of circumstances.45  The determination should 
include careful consideration of the social context in which the behavior occurs, 
 
 36. Id. at 22–23. 
 37. Id. at 23. 
 38. 510 U.S. at 23.  The Court relied in its ruling on facts found by the Magistrate, noting that 
the company president often  insulted the employee because of her gender and often made her the 
target of unwanted sexual innuendos; occasionally asked her and other employees to get coins from 
his front pocket; and threw objects on the ground in front of her and other women and asked them 
to pick them up.  Id. at 19−20.  The Court stated that the district court had adopted the Magistrate’s 
report and recommendations and found that this was a “close case.”  Id. at 20. 
 39. See id. at 24. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 24−25.  Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence stated that “[t]he critical issue, Title VII’s 
text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of 
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”  Id. at 25. 
 42. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 43. Id. at 77, 79. 
 44. Id. at 78 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21).  In advocating this 
interpretation of Title VII to include same-sex harassment, Justice Scalia noted that “. . .statutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is 
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which 
we are governed.”  Id. at 79. 
 45. See id. at 81 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).  In Oncale, Justice Scalia seems to be responding to 
his concern about the vagueness of the standard which he expressed in Harris. 
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 [because] the real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a 
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations and relationships 
which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of words used or the 
physical acts performed.  Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to 
social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple 
teasing or roughhousing . . . and conduct which a reasonable person in the 
plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.46 
Also significant in Oncale are the specific references to conduct which could 
and could not be considered severe.47  Explicit or implicit proposals of sexual 
activity could be considered severe; conduct which could be considered severe 
need not be motivated by sexual desire, but instead could be motivated by 
general hostility toward the presence of the victim in the workplace based on 
gender.48  Conduct will not be considered severe “merely because the words 
used have sexual content or connotations.”49  The Court affirmed that requiring 
the conduct to be objectively severe or pervasive would “ensure that courts and 
juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace - such as . . . 
intersexual flirtation - for discriminatory ‘conditions of employment.’” 50  Justice 
Scalia explicitly warned against expanding Title VII into “a general civility 
code.”51 
[T]he statute does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men 
and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite 
sex.  The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither 
asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so 
objectively offensive as to alter the “conditions” of the victim’s employment.52 
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton53 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,54 
both decided in 1998, the Court focused on how courts should determine when 
 
 46. Id. at 81−82.  See generally Rebecca K. Lee, Pink, White, and Blue: Class Assumptions in the 
Judicial Interpretations of Title VII Hostile Environment Sex Harassment, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 677 (2005) 
(discussing class assumptions in examining the social context effecting a determination of what is 
offensive conduct, but noting that vulgarity is common within white collar environments); see also 
Melissa R. Null, Note, Disrespectful, Offensive, Boorish & Decidedly Immature Behavior is Not Sufficient to 
Meet the Requirement of Title VII: Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 69 MO. L. REV. 255, 271−73 (2004) 
(suggesting that the Supreme Court did not adequately clarify the social context factor under the 
totality of circumstances test, resulting in different applications of severe or pervasive based on the 
economic status of the worker); Duncan, infra Part III. 
 47. 532 U.S. at 78−80 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25).  The Oncale opinion provides no guidance 
about what might constitute pervasive conduct. 
 48. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 81. 
 51. Id.  But see Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment, in MACKINNON & 
SIEGEL, supra note 6, at 176.  “. . .Oncale’s admonition that Title VII does not impose a civility code on 
the workplace has had the effect of kicking open the door to a new ‘horseplay defense’  to sexual 
harassment claims”; the author lists conduct that has been dismissed as “mere” teasing and 
horseplay as improperly being characterized as within the genuine but innocuous differences in the 
way men and women interact. 
 52. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. 
 53. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 54. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
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employers are liable for workplace harassment in violation of Title VII based on 
acts of supervisors and subordinates.55  In Faragher, the Court reiterated its 
commitment to the contours of this cause of action set forth in its precedent,56 
describing these standards as “sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII 
does not become a ‘general civility code.’”57  The Court also offered additional 
guidance about conduct which could and could not be considered severe: the 
conduct must be extreme to alter the terms and conditions of employment;58 
“simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely 
serious) will not amount to [such] changes in the terms and conditions of 
employment”;59 proper application of the standards “will filter out complaints 
attacking ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of 
abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.’”60 
Thus, in this way, between 1986 and 1998, the Supreme Court set out the 
cause of action for hostile work environment sexual harassment and developed 
standards for its adjudication. 
PART II 
We do not transform Title VII into a workplace “civility code,” [citation omitted] 
when we condemn conduct less severe than that which shocks our conscience.  
And when we raise the bar . . .[so]. . . high . . .[,] it becomes more likely that we 
will miss the more subtle forms of sex discrimination that may still infest the 
 
 55. “We hold that an employer is vicariously liable for actionable discrimination caused by a 
supervisor, but subject to an affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer’s 
conduct as well as that of a plaintiff victim.”  Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780; and see Burlington, 524 U.S. at 
746−47, 754−55. 
 56. See 524 U.S. at 786−88. 
 57. Id. at 788 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80). 
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. (omitting quotation marks indicating reliance on Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82). 
 60. Id. (quoting B. LINDEMANN & D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, 175 
(1992)). The Court revisited the standard for establishing a violation of Title VII based on the 
creation of a hostile work environment in Clark Co. School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) and 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).  The Court in Clark, relying explicitly on 
its prior rulings, reiterated that conduct must be severe or pervasive, and that this is determined by 
looking at all the circumstances, including the Harris factors; the Court restated “that simple teasing, 
offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) [would] not . . . [constitute] 
changes in the ‘terms or conditions of employment.’”  532 U.S. at 271.  It concluded that the single 
incident in the record was “at worst an ‘isolated incident’ that cannot remotely be considered 
‘extremely serious’ as our cases require,” and therefore, could not have been considered by a 
reasonable person to have violated Title VII. See id. 270−71 (citations omitted). 
In a claim of a racially hostile work environment, the Court in Morgan, without explicitly 
undermining its suggestion in Clark that a single extremely serious incident could create a hostile 
work environment, recognized that “[h]ostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete 
acts.  Their very nature involves repeated conduct.” 536 U.S. at 115 (citation omitted).  Therefore, the 
challenged conduct “occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete 
acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.  . . .  Such claims are based on the 
cumulative affect of individual acts.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
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workplace, and make it more difficult for women, especially, to participate on 
terms of equality with their male counterparts.61 
Perhaps the major reason for the landscape of confusing and inconsistent 
outcomes in cases involving sexual harassment hostile work environment claims 
is the failure of courts to follow the standards articulated by the Supreme Court 
to determine whether conduct is severe or pervasive.  Courts have unnecessarily 
struggled to define when there is liability because conduct was severe – 
somewhere on the spectrum between innocuous flirtation and assault – or 
because the conduct was pervasive – somewhere on the spectrum between 
isolated and constant.62  The needless discomfort with how to evaluate conduct 
has also led to an unjustified number of summary dispositions for defendants 
and vacated jury determinations for plaintiffs.63 
The difficulty courts have in applying the severe or pervasive standard has 
been to some degree due to confusion about the reasoning and the significance 
of the Supreme Court cases.  The reasons behind the analytical errors committed 
by lower courts are explored in this section. 
A. Narrow application of Supreme Court precedent. 
Too often Supreme Court cases are relied on for only the narrowest of 
rulings.  Meritor is primarily recognized for establishing the cause of action for 
hostile work environment, requiring that the conduct be severe or pervasive 
based on the totality of circumstances, and holding that the victim need not have 
endured economic harm.64  The Harris case is most cited for the proposition that 
there need not be psychological harm to establish the creation of a hostile work 
environment, and that plaintiff must satisfy both a subjective and an objective 
 
 61. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1268 (11th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J. concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 62. See RAYMOND F. GREGORY, UNWELCOME AND UNLAWFUL: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE 
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 58−59 (2004). 
 63. See, e.g., authorities cited, supra note 5; Beiner, supra note 6; Schnapper, supra note 6, at 
294−307 (discussing the appropriate role for juries in sexual harassment hostile work environment 
cases), 344 (“The appropriate response of the legal system to less severe forms of harassment should 
be the same response to less severe physical assaults – lower damages.  Judicial efforts to delineate a 
safe harbor for lower level harassment seek to impose an all-or-nothing rule to cases involving 
differences in degree; damages, on the other hand, can be calibrated to take into account just those 
types of differences.”) Contributing to the analytical uncertainty is the fact that even in 2008, many 
judges assigned to these cases, in both district and appellate courts, have an aversion to such cases, 
perhaps because of their gender and/or life experiences.  See BEINER, supra note 8, at 30 (noting that 
the demographics of the federal judiciary suggest leaving this fact-specific inquiry to juries because 
the severe or pervasive standard depends on community standards which are best imposed by a 
jury, rather than a judge); Gregory, supra note 25, at 775−76 (addressing judicial discomfort with 
sexual harassment cases as opposed to racial harassment cases); Schnapper, supra note 6, at 325 
(noting that evaluation of conduct to determine if it was severe or pervasive is complex and fact 
specific, ordinarily appropriate for a jury). In a genuine effort to try to heed the warning of the 
Supreme Court, trial judges have wanted to avoid turning Title VII into a “general civility code;” 
perhaps this has made them more inclined to view the complained-of conduct as petty or trivial, i.e., 
the vicissitudes of the workplace with which workers should cope. 
 64. See 477 U.S. at 67−68. 
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test.65  In addition, the Harris factors often are cited.66  Oncale is most frequently 
thought of as the case which recognized a claim for same-sex harassment.67  
Faragher is relied on when determining employer liability.68  However, these 
cases provide explicit guidance as to what constitutes objectively severe or 
pervasive harassment, and when courts limit the application of these Supreme 
Court decisions to such narrow holdings, it results in inconsistent and irrational 
decisions. 
B. Failure to differentiate the subjective and objective tests. 
Harris and subsequent Supreme Court cases require that in order to prevail 
the plaintiff in a Title VII sexual harassment hostile work environment case must 
satisfy two tests – the subjective (whether the victim experienced the 
environment as hostile or abusive) and the objective (whether a reasonable 
person would have found the environment to have been hostile or abusive).69  
However, lower courts have not adequately separated the evaluation of 
evidence needed to satisfy each test.  Consequently, many courts have not 
addressed the facts before them in terms of two independent tests, but instead 
have confused or melded what the victim experienced with what a reasonable 
person might conclude objectively about the workplace.70  When courts confuse 
the subjective and objective test, the conclusion that a plaintiff was not 
threatened or bothered by the conduct, and therefore the conduct was not 
objectively severe, leads future courts to rely on that decision to rule that similar 
conduct could not be viewed by the reasonable person as severe.71 
Additionally, when Justice O’Connor in Harris declared that the Court was 
taking a “middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely 
offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury,” 
she may have contributed to the confusion which lower courts have 
encountered. 72  The problem with Justice O’Connor’s reasoning is that “merely 
offensive” refers to the nature of the behavior, and presumably therefore would 
be an aspect of the objective test, and “tangible psychological injury” refers to 
the victim’s reaction to the conduct, and therefore would logically be part of the 
subjective test.73  It is thus unclear whether finding the “middle path” entails 
objectively examining the conduct of the harasser or examining the subjective 
reaction of the victim.  There also is uncertainty about whether and how this 
search for the middle path relates to the severe or pervasive standard.  Justice 
 
 65. See 510 U.S. at 21−23. 
 66. Id. at 23. 
 67. See generally 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 68. See 524 U.S. at 786−88. 
 69. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787. 
 70. See generally, Elizabeth Monroe Shaffer, Comment, Defining the “Environment” in Title VII 
Hostile Work Environment Claims: Appellate Courts, Classism, and Sexual Harassment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 
695  (2002) (asserting that the objective test is sometimes used to discount the plaintiff’s subjective 
reaction). See also, discussion of Mitchell v. Pope, 189 F.App’x 911 (11th Cir. 2006), infra  Part III. 
 71. See BEINER, supra note 8, at 28 (discussing how “bad precedent leads to bad precedent”); 
Beiner, supra note 6, at 817−19; Johnson, supra note 6, at 114−15.   
 72. 510 U.S. at 21. 
 73. Id. 
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O’Connor appears to be referring to the subjective test when discussing the 
“middle path,” but her use of a spectrum that seems to involve both subjective 
and objective factors muddled the separation of these tests.74  Instead, courts 
should consider the claim based on whether the plaintiff can satisfy the 
subjective test, on the one hand, and the objective test on the other.75 
C. Confusion in applying the totality test. 
The Court in Harris affirmed its statement in Meritor that the facts in each 
case must be examined based on the totality of circumstances, and declared that 
this is not a mathematically precise evaluation and that no single factor is 
required.76  Justice O’Connor listed factors which may be considered within the 
totality test: “. . . the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance; 
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 
performance.”77 
The list of Harris factors created confusion in how conduct was to be 
evaluated to determine whether it could be considered severe or pervasive.  The 
list has offered the lower courts, which have an affinity for numbered tests, with 
a seemingly concrete set of standards which have achieved a prominence that 
could not have been intended by Justice O’Connor.  These courts have used the 
factors as requirements for proving hostile work environment rather than as 
considerations within a totality test.  This has led to reading the severity and 
frequency factors as requiring that the conduct be both severe and pervasive.78  
Other courts facially recognize the Harris factors in setting up the analysis, but 
do not utilize them in any meaningful way.79  The Supreme Court stated in 
 
 74. Under the subjective test the Court in Harris seemed to be primarily interested in whether 
there was some evidence that the harassment was upsetting to the plaintiff at the time it occurred and 
thus affected a term or condition of the plaintiff’s employment. See id. at 21−22. The Court stated that 
evidence of the plaintiff’s psychological harm is not determinative, id. at 20−22, rejecting the 
requirement imposed in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 75. For an example of a court’s clear delineation of these tests, see, e.g., Crowley v. L.L. Bean, 
Co., 303 F.3d 387, 397 (1st Cir. 2002) (rejecting the employer’s argument that in order to prevail on 
the subjective test, the victim must have believed that the conduct met the legal definition of 
unlawful sexual harassment; and ruling that the victim had presented sufficient evidence for the jury 
to conclude that she did satisfy the subjective test because she perceived the perpetrator’s conduct as 
hostile and abusive and the jury reasonably credited plaintiff’s testimony that she was frightened, 
feared for her safety, was shaking, breaking down and upset, and felt as though she was going to be 
hurt). 
 76. 510 U.S. at 23. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See generally Heather L. Kleinschmidt, Note, Reconsidering Severe or Pervasive: Aligning the 
Standard in Sexual Harassment and Racial Harassment Causes of Action, 80 IND. L. J. 1119 (2005) (noting 
that the Seventh Circuit seems to apply a severe and pervasive standard). 
 79. See, e.g., BEINER supra note 8, at 26 (noting that courts conclude that conduct was not 
sufficiently severe or pervasive without considering the totality of circumstances, engaging in a 
“divide and conquer approach” to the facts); Vivien Toomey Montz, Shifting Parameters: An 
Examination of Recent Changes in the Baseline of Actionable Conduct for Hostile Working Environment 
Sexual Harassment., 3 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 809, 842 (2002) (stating that when courts “disaggregate” 
conduct it “robs the incidents of their cumulative effect and nullifies both the pattern and harassing 
nature of the conduct.”). 
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Meritor, and reiterated in Harris and in each subsequent case, that conduct need 
only be severe or pervasive.80 
The misapplication of the Harris factors has allowed courts to ignore the 
more nuanced standards which emerge from the Supreme Court cases and from 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Harris.  Synthesizing the Harris factors with the 
rest of the analysis in that case, and with the discussions and rulings in the other 
Supreme Court cases, would result in a more sensible analytical standard.  
Although the Harris factors could be explicitly referred to as a broad explanation 
of relevant considerations, each one needs to be placed within the analysis of 
whether conduct could be considered severe or pervasive. 
The “frequency of the discriminatory conduct” should logically be 
considered as one of the factors in the determination of whether conduct could 
be considered pervasive.81  However, frequency is not the only relevant 
consideration for the pervasive standard.  Courts look at the cumulative effect 
and pattern of the conduct, the setting and whether the conduct is easily 
escaped, the number of co-workers participating in the conduct, and the 
duration of the behavior.82  All of these considerations aid a fact-finder in 
determining whether the conduct “permeate[s] [the environment] with 
‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.’”83 
The inclusion of “severity” as one of the factors in the totality test offered 
no guidance, since the totality test is imposed to determine whether the conduct 
was severe (or pervasive).84  Further describing the totality test, Justice O’Connor 
considered “whether [the conduct was] physically threatening or humiliating, or 
a mere offensive utterance[.]”85  This suggests a method for determining if the 
conduct was severe.  She further proposed examining “. . . whether [the 
conduct] unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”86  
However, this appears to relate both to the subjective and objective tests, since 
interference with work performance is one of the indicators that the plaintiff was 
subjectively harmed, and can also be an indicator of whether a reasonable 
person could find that the conduct was severe enough to create a hostile work 
environment.87  As described below in Part IV, we offer a useful framework for 
understanding the Harris factors that is consistent with the intention of those 
factors and provides a rational approach to determining whether conduct was 
severe on the one hand, or pervasive on the other. 
 
 80. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 117−18 (extensively reviewing decisions in which courts 
misapplied the Harris factors by requiring satisfaction of all of them). Sometimes courts do not cite to 
Harris when they enumerate the Harris factors, failing to acknowledge the Supreme Court as the 
source, which suggests that litigators and/or judges are not reading the Supreme Court cases.  See, 
e.g., Mitchell v. Pape, 189 F.App’x 911, 913 (11th Cir. 2006); Pomales v. Celulares Telefonica, Inc., 447 
F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2006); Cowen v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 141 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 81. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. 
 82. See, e.g., Schnapper, supra note 6, at 327−32 (discussing various approaches to the pervasive 
standard in response to its being “vague and manipulable”). 
 83. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65). 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. at 23. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See DISCUSSION, supra Part IIB. 
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D. Imposition of original standards. 
Some courts have ignored the Supreme Court language and reasoning in 
favor of an entirely different and original analysis.88  A leading example which 
has had substantial impact beyond the Seventh Circuit is Baskerville v. Culligan 
International Co 89  In Baskerville, Judge Posner reversed a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff, declaring that “[t]he concept of sexual harassment is designed to 
protect working women from the kind of male attentions that can make the 
workplace hellish for women.”90  The court held that this was not a “hellish” 
work environment.91  Judge Posner also stated: “It is no doubt distasteful to a 
sensitive woman to have such a silly man as one’s boss, but only a woman of 
Victorian delicacy – a woman mysteriously aloof from contemporary American 
popular culture in all its sex-saturated vulgarity . . .” would find the conduct 
offensive.92  He stated this even though the jury apparently shared the plaintiff’s 
sensibilities. 
At no time has the Supreme Court articulated a requirement that the 
workplace must be “hellish.”  In fact, most of the Court’s explanation of what 
constitutes severe conduct has focused on the opposite end of the spectrum, 
stating that actionable conduct was somewhere beyond “ordinary socializing” 
and “flirtation.”93  Justice O’Connor stated in Harris that to be actionable, 
conduct did not have to be as reprehensible as the  conduct in Meritor.94  Judge 
Posner’s requirement that the workplace be “hellish” set the threshold for 
determining whether conduct is actionable higher than was intended by the 
Supreme Court.  This has influenced other courts to set the bar too high.  Judge 
Posner correctly stated in the opinion that Title VII “. . .is not designed to purge 
the workplace of vulgarity.”95  However, imposing the requirement that a 
workplace be “hellish” is an excessive response to the concern that Title VII 
should not be imposed as a civility code.96 
 
 88. See, e.g., cases, infra Part III. 
 89. 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (conduct included among other acts, the plaintiff’s boss 
making grunting sounds to the plaintiff when she wore a leather skirt; announcing on the PA system 
that “all pretty girls run around naked;” making a hand gesture intended to suggest masturbation; 
and telling the plaintiff that he had better clean up his act and he should think of her as “Miss Anita 
Hill”). 
 90. 50 F.3d at 430.  Judge Posner cites no authority for this proposition.  See Cheryl L. Anderson, 
“Thinking Within the Box”: How Proof Models Are Used to Limit the Scope of Sexual Harassment Law, 19 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 125, 145−48 (2001) (describing the Baskerville characterization as a 
“yardstick” by which subsequent hostile work environment clams were measured in that Circuit).  
In addition, a WestLaw Keycite of the headnote in which Judge Posner stated that Title VII was 
designed to protect women from the kind of male attentions that make a workplace “hellish” 
produced over 255 citing cases, the overwhelming majority of which cited this favorably.  (August 3, 
2007).  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 431. 
 93. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. 
 94. 510 U.S. at 22.  See Meritor, supra note 29. 
 95. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430. 
 96. See also, Montz, supra note 79, at 841 (discussing Shepherd v. The Comptroller of Public 
Accountants of Texas, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999), which stated that “Title VII was only meant 
to bar conduct that is so severe and pervasive that it destroys a protected class member’s opportunity 
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PART III 
In the following cases, the courts disposed of plaintiff’s Title VII claims of 
hostile work environment sexual harassment by reversing a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff or by granting summary judgment for the defendant. 97  We discuss how 
the court’s treatment of the facts in each case demonstrates some or all of the 
errors we described in Part II, resulting in decisions which are contrary to what 
a reasonable fact-finder could have determined.  We then apply a more rational 
analysis based on the Supreme Court’s explanation of the severe or pervasive 
standard, to describe how an appropriate outcome could have been reached. 
A. Mitchell v. Pope, 189 F.App’x 911 (11th Cir. 2006) 
A female Deputy Sheriff, Donya Mitchell, alleged that in the County 
Sheriff’s Department where she worked she was sexually harassed by another 
officer, Major Michael Overbey, in violation of Title VII.98  The district court 
granted summary judgment for the defendants99 and the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, stating the conduct was not sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to be actionable. 
Ms. Mitchell described sixteen incidents of harassment that occurred from 
1999 to 2002.100  One incident involved Mr. Overbey telling Ms. Mitchell that 
“you can just walk into the room and I get an erection.”101  He also called the 
plaintiff a “frigid bitch” on two occasions: once when he tried to kiss her after a 
Sheriff’s department Christmas party and another time when she refused to join 
him in a hot tub at a hotel where they were attending a conference.102  On a 
separate occasion, he told her that “her ass sure does look fine” and suggested 
she wear certain jeans.103  Mr. Overbey chased plaintiff around the office, and 
also appeared several times in her driveway during one month.104  One of those 
times he was drunk and told Ms Mitchell’s son that he loved the plaintiff.105  He 
touched or attempted to touch her three times: he attempted to kiss her; he 
rubbed up against and reached across her chest; and, he lifted her over his 
head.106 On some occasions he directed sexualized comments to Ms. Mitchell and 
 
to succeed in the workplace.”  The author points out that this standard is far harsher than the 
Supreme Court’s requirements.) 
 97. Mitchell v. Pope, 189 F.App’x 911 (11th Cir. 2006); Moser v. MCC Outdoor, LLC, 459 F. 
Supp. 2d 415 (M.D.N.C. 2006); Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002); See also, 
Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 214 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (failing to properly evaluate the conduct, 
which included what the court described as an “assault” or “attack” by an employee who fondled 
the plaintiff’s stomach and bare breast, but also confusing the severe or pervasive standard with the 
separate consideration of employer liability); see supra note 5 for articles discussing examples of 
additional cases. 
 98. 189 F.App’x at 913. 
 99. The defendants were the Sheriff, Major Overbey, and the Sheriff’s Department. 
 100. Id. at 913, n. 3 (describing the sixteen incidents only in a footnote in the opinion). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 189 F.App’x at 913, n.3. 
 106. Id. 
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other officers.107  One such incident occurred at a golf tournament where Ms. 
Mitchell was working a security detail.108  Mr. Overbey told a group of officers, 
including the plaintiff, that at another golf tournament strippers were the 
caddies and the strippers were directed “. . .to place golf balls into their vaginas 
and to squirt them onto the green.”109 
In rejecting Ms. Mitchell’s hostile work environment claim, the Eleventh 
Circuit misconstrued the Harris totality test and ignored or misapplied the 
synthesis of the reasoning in the Supreme Court cases in reaching the decision 
that a jury could not reasonably find that Ms. Mitchell was the victim of severe 
or pervasive sexual harassment.110  Without citing the Harris case, the court 
imposed a four-part analysis based on the Harris factors: frequency; severity; 
physically threatening and humiliating or mere offensive utterance; and 
unreasonable interference with job performance.111  The court appeared to treat 
these factors as prongs of a test, each needing to be satisfied separately, rather 
than as factors within a totality test.  The court stated that sixteen incidents in 
four years was not frequent enough.  The court later stated “. . .that this 
behavior –given its relative infrequency- is not the kind of ‘severe’ harassment 
necessary for liability to attach under Title VII.”112  Here, the court used 
frequency as a threshold test that must be satisfied when determining whether 
the conduct is severe, rather than discussing the pervasive standard 
independently and providing an explanation of why sixteen incidents did not 
contribute to a finding of pervasive harassment.113 
The court went on to explain that there were only three incidents of 
physical conduct and that Ms. Mitchell did not assert that she felt threatened by 
the physical conduct.114  The court seemed to confuse the subjective test with the 
objective test.  The victim’s reaction to the conduct is a separate inquiry from 
whether a reasonable person would have found the conduct threatening.115  
There may have been grounds to find that the subjective test was not met in this 
case and therefore that there was no violation of Title VII, but the court never 
addressed the subjective test separately to determine whether the plaintiff found 
the circumstances intolerable and unreasonably interfered with her job 
performance.116  If the court had concluded that Ms. Mitchell did not feel 
threatened or humiliated by Mr. Overbey’s actions and did not complain to 
supervisors in a timely manner, then the court should have determined that the 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Mitchell, 189 F.App’x at 913. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 912. 
 111. Id. at 913. 
 112. Id. at 913–14. 
 113. See DISCUSSION, supra Part II C. that the test should be applied as the Court intended, in the 
alternative: severe or pervasive. 
 114. 189 F.App’x at 913. 
 115. See DISCUSSION, supra Part II B. that the objective and subjective tests should be applied 
independently, also as the Court intended. 
 116. Id. at 914 (concluding that health problems on the part of plaintiff were the greatest 
hindrance to her job performance and led to the confrontation with the sheriff and ultimately to her 
resignation). 
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subjective test was not satisfied.117  The court’s conclusion that the plaintiff did 
not feel threatened by the conduct, and therefore that the conduct was not 
severe, gives future courts the opportunity to rely on these facts as an example 
of the type of harassment that should not be viewed as objectively hostile even in 
cases where the plaintiff clearly satisfies the subjective test. 
In its brief discussion of the nature of the conduct, the court stated that the 
conduct was “reprehensible” and “crass and juvenile,” but also stated that much 
of the conduct was “horseplay.”118  Not only did the court fail to identify which 
incidents should be classified as “horseplay,” but it also did not state what 
constitutes “horseplay”.119  “Horseplay” was used by the Supreme Court in 
Oncale to describe conduct that would not be actionable.120  The term the Court 
used, however, was “male on male horseplay,” which in the context of the 
Oncale case, was relevant because it was a same-sex harassment case and the 
egregious conduct in that case was not considered horseplay.121  Even if 
“horseplay” were applied to male-female interactions, the only behavior that 
conceivably might be considered horseplay was Mr. Overbey’s turning the 
bathroom lights on and off.122  However, this incident would have to be viewed 
in isolation from all the other highly sexualized conduct to simply dismiss this 
incident as “horseplay.” 
The court offered no meaningful case comparisons to support its 
conclusion that the conduct was not actionable.  The court never discussed what 
conduct would be considered severe.  It compared, without explanation, this 
case to two Eleventh Circuit cases in which the court concluded that the conduct 
was not objectively severe or pervasive.123  However, in Mendoza, there were no 
sexually explicit comments and most of the conduct consisted of plaintiff feeling 
as though she was being stared at by her co-worker when he looked at her groin 
area and made sniffing sounds.124  The conduct in the Mitchell case was more 
sexually explicit than in Mendoza.125  The Mitchell court also cited to Gupta,126 
 
 117. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22 (stating that “if the victim does not subjectively perceive the 
environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim’s 
employment, and there is no Title VII violation.”)  The court also could have made an independent 
conclusion regarding employer liability as the basis for its disposition. 
 118. 189 F.App’x at 913. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. 
 121. The plaintiff in Oncale was subjected to forcible sex-related, humiliating actions on multiple 
occasions, sexual physical assault, and a threat of rape.  See 523 U.S. at 77.  The Court declined to 
detail the incidents in the interest of “both brevity and dignity.”  Id. 
The Court’s characterization of “male on male horseplay” suggests that this is not a category best 
used to describe male-female interactions in the workplace, and that the terms the Supreme Court 
used in the same section of Oncale, “intersexual flirtation” and “ordinary socializing,” are better 
suited for describing the types of male–female interactions that are not actionable.  See id. at 81. 
 122. 189 F.App’x at 913. 
 123. Id. at 914; Mendoza v. Borden, 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 124. See 195 F.3d at 1243 (addressing the cumulative effect and the totality test in determining 
that the conduct was very mild).  In Mitchell, the court seemed to ignore the totality test and isolated 
the incidents. 
 125. The conduct in Mendoza perhaps also could have been found to have violated Title VII 
under the test the authors apply here. 
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which involved no explicit or crude sexual comments or actions; rather, the 
conduct consisted of persistent uncomfortable attention by a male co-worker 
toward the plaintiff.127  Leaving aside whether Gupta or Mendoza were properly 
decided, neither of these cases which were relied on by the court contain the 
overt sexual comments and unambiguous sexual behavior that occurred here. 
The Supreme Court in Oncale stated that intersexual flirtation and ordinary 
socializing do not create discriminatory conditions in the workplace.128  A male 
coworker telling a female coworker that she gives him an erection could be 
found by a reasonable person to go beyond ordinary socializing and intersexual 
flirtation.  This comment when viewed in the context of the other humiliating 
incidents shows a workplace permeated with sexually offensive conduct rather 
that an example of innocuous differences in the way men and women routinely 
interact.  Had the court considered the cumulative effect of the sixteen incidents, 
the court may have had more difficulty concluding the conduct was not 
objectively severe or pervasive.129  These were not isolated offensive utterances, 
but a pattern of explicit verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature.  These 
were not examples of the ordinary tribulations of the workplace. 
B. Moser v. MCC Outdoor, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 415 (M.D.N.C. 2006) 
Plaintiff  Moser was a Sales Representative for a company that sold 
outdoor advertising spaces.130  Throughout her twelve months of employment, 
Ms. Moser was repeatedly harassed by Eddie Jones, her sales manager, and by 
three other male sales representatives: George Wilkes, Kelly Phipps, and Tom 
Poe.131  The court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and, in its 
opinion, divided the conduct into touching incidents, statements, and various 
other acts toward the plaintiff.132  When the court applied the severe or pervasive 
standard to the facts, ruling that the allegations were not sufficiently frequent or 
serious, it summarized the numerous incidents as follows: 
Plaintiff experienced mild touching like . . . attempted kisses and touches, 
including Wilkes’s popping [her buttocks] with a plastic water bottle, fellow 
employees twice trying to lift, or engaging in conduct that might lead to a lifting 
of, Plaintiff’s skirt, and Jones’s infrequent side hugs during the year-long 
employment, leg touches on one car trip, or kisses at a local restaurant.133 
Within this recitation of facts, the court failed to mention that the plaintiff had 
thwarted an attempt by Phipps to touch her breasts.134  The court only 
mentioned this incident at the beginning of the case and not when analyzing the 
 
 126. Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 127. 109 F.App’x at 914. 
 128. 523 U.S. at 81. 
 129. See Mitchell, 189 F.App’x at 913–14. 
 130. Moser, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 418. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 418–19. 
 133. Id. at 421. 
 134. Id. at 418. 
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facts to determine if the conduct was severe or pervasive.135  The court continued 
its summary of the harassment: 
Additionally, . . . Plaintiff experienced mild and infrequent verbal abuse.  For 
example, Wilkes once told Plaintiff to slow down in her stride because she was 
bouncing, commented that he could see Plaintiff’s underwear, called Plaintiff a 
“dingbat” and “dumb blonde,” and told her he knew she would have an affair 
with someone in the office.  Phipps once told Plaintiff that he wished to have 
sexual intercourse with her, and Poe once stated that he would consider having 
sexual intercourse with Plaintiff.  Poe also once asked Plaintiff if she were 
wearing a thong and shared personal information about his love life.  Poe 
stopped describing acts with his wife after Plaintiff told him to stop several 
times. . . .  Jones stated he loved Plaintiff, stated he wished to have sexual 
intercourse with Plaintiff, suggested Plaintiff was familiar with directions to his 
house because of her frequent visits there, said he would “do her,” and 
suggested it was a good thing she worked out because she did not have sexual 
intercourse as an outlet for her energy.  Jones also stated his desire to engage in 
sexual intercourse with women, commented on women’s breasts and buttocks, 
told Plaintiff he favored small breasts, and commented to another employee, in 
Plaintiff’s presence, that they should ask Plaintiff about various sexual 
techniques.136 
Plaintiff witnessed or experienced several acts of similar frequency and severity.  
A fellow employee took a picture of Plaintiff’s behind without Plaintiff’s prior 
knowledge.  Jones showed Plaintiff a picture of a little boy with a large phallus 
superimposed upon him saying that this was he when he was young.137 
The court also noted that the plaintiff’s conduct at the company was not “model 
either.”138  Fellow employees complained about plaintiff’s loud and abrasive 
tone.139  Plaintiff had nicknames for the fellow employees, such as “baldy,” 
“chubby” and “Lucifer.”140 
The court explained that the plaintiff had complained about some of the 
conduct to her General Manager who, after attempting once to mediate the 
problem, threatened to fire the plaintiff and one of the harassers.141  Eventually 
Ms. Moser was fired after loudly arguing with another employee.142  Plaintiff 
then filed her lawsuit claiming violations of Title VII.143 
The court determined that the conduct was “not sufficiently frequent and 
serious.”144  It described the Harris factors and then stated that the totality of facts 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Moser, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 419. 
 137. Id. at 421-22. 
 138. Id. at 419. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  This description of plaintiff’s behavior would only be relevant in an evaluation of the 
subjective test, and concluding that she was abrasive, loud, and gave some employees non-
sexualized nicknames was improper as further justification for denying plaintiff relief within the 
objective test. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Moser, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 419. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 421. 
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must show more than unpleasantness, cruelness, or vulgarity,145 citing a 1997 
Fourth Circuit case, Hartsell v. Cuplex Prods. Inc.146  The court then relied on 
Baskerville147 for the proposition that the workplace must be “hellish”.148  Even in 
2006, the Moser court relied on the Baskerville “hellish” standard from 1995 and a 
Fourth Circuit case from 1997, failing to follow the Supreme Court guidance on 
what is severe or pervasive. 149 
Evaluating the explicit conduct in Moser, the court relied primarily on a 
comparison to the conduct in Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago,150 decided 
by the Seventh Circuit in 1993.151  The court tried to show similarities to the 
Moser facts in order to conclude that the harassment in Moser did not reach an 
actionable level.152  The court in Weiss summarized its facts as follows:153 
Weiss describes a number of incidents of employment-related sexual 
harassment.  By her second week, Lawrence, who was warehouse manager and 
one of Weiss’ supervisors, began asking Weiss about her personal life and 
complimenting her, telling her how beautiful she was.  By her fourth week, 
Lawrence began asking her for dates.  Weiss told Lawrence that she would not 
have a sexual or dating relationship with a co-worker.  Lawrence said he 
understood and went on about his business.  Several weeks later, however, 
Lawrence asked Weiss to a wedding.  Weiss also complains that Lawrence 
would jokingly call her a “dumb blond” when errors in her inventory counts 
would come out.  She treated these statements as jokes, but stated that it 
bothered her when he called her that in front of other employees. 
When Weiss had difficulties with a month-end inventory, she called Lawrence 
at home for assistance.  Lawrence then called later from a bar to check on how 
the inventory was proceeding.  He invited her to come to the bar when she was 
finished.  Weiss went there with a friend and another co-worker.  Lawrence 
bought them a drink, discussed their inventory problem, and they played darts.  
Lawrence later put his arm around Weiss’ chair and tried to kiss her, but she 
pulled back, said she was leaving and went home.  The next week, Lawrence 
placed “I love you” signs in Weiss’ work area.  Weiss threatened to report it to 
their supervisors if it ever happened again, but it did not.  Weiss testified that 
Lawrence put his hand on her shoulder at least six times during her 
employment.  On one occasion she objected, and he took his hand off of her 
shoulder.  Finally, after having testified that Lawrence avoided her in June, 
Weiss later stated that Lawrence had approached her twice in the front office at 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. 123 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 147. Bakersville, supra note 89; see DISCUSSION,  supra Part II D. 
 148. Moser, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 421. 
 149. In a subsequent Title VII sexual harassment case, the Eleventh Circuit seems to have 
reached a reasonable conclusion that summary judgment for defendant was inappropriate, in light 
of plaintiff’s having advanced evidence which would support satisfaction of both the subjective and 
objective tests.  However, it applied the Harris factors as prongs of a test, even as it cautioned against 
fixating on any single factor.  See Meyers v. Cent. Fla. Investments, Inc., 2007 WL 1667212. at 3 (11th 
Cir. 2007). 
 150. 990 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 151. Moser, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 421. 
 152. Id. at 421—22. 
 153. 990 F.2d at 334—35. 
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Coca-Cola and tried to kiss her.  She responded by pulling away and asking him 
to leave her alone. 
Leaving aside the issue of whether Weiss was correctly decided, it is hard to 
conceive that these two cases would be seen as similar.  There was no conduct in 
Weiss that was as explicitly sexual as in Moser: there was no attempt to grab her 
breasts; the plaintiff’s co-worker never explicitly stated that he was interested in 
having sexual intercourse; there were no comments about the plaintiff’s and 
others’ body parts and/or inquiries into the plaintiff’s and other’s sex lives.  All 
of these were present in Moser.154  Although the court acknowledged that the 
conduct in Moser “was over a longer span and included more instances” than in 
Weiss, it nevertheless concluded that “neither case presented a hellish 
environment akin to daily vulgar and offensive acts.”155  The court implicitly 
supported its decision by considering the conduct as “isolated incidents of 
minor seriousness.”156 
When three of the four male co-workers whom plaintiff accused of 
harassment in Moser explicitly expressed their interest in having sexual 
intercourse with her, this reasonably could be interpreted as more than mere 
intersexual flirtation and ordinary socializing.157  Indeed, this is precisely the 
kind of conduct identified by Meritor and the subsequent Supreme Court cases 
as possible examples of severe conduct.158  Moreover, the plaintiff here endured 
this offensive conduct regularly for twelve months,159 and the court failed to 
address the pattern and frequency of this behavior, its cumulative effect, or the 
likelihood of repetition or inescapability.  The court thereby failed to evaluate 
the potential for a reasonable conclusion that the behavior was pervasive.  It 
merely drew a parenthetical comparison160 to Smith v. First Union National 
Bank,161 where the plaintiff endured a barrage of harassment over thirty times 
during the first few weeks of her employment - clearly an extreme situation and 
an outlier case improperly relied on to define a threshold for considering 
conduct pervasive. 
C. Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002) 
In August 1994, through an arrangement with the Junior College District of 
St. Louis, Diana Duncan began work as a technical training clerk providing in-
house support at a General Motors Corporation (GMC) manufacturing facility.162  
Throughout her tenure, from 1994-1997, Ms. Duncan was subjected to 
 
 154. 459 F. Supp.2d at 418–19. 
 155. Id. at 422. 
 156. Id. at 421. 
 157. See 523 U.S. at 81. 
 158. See DISCUSSION, supra Part I, noting the Court’s reliance on the EEOC Guidelines, 29 CFR § 
1604.11(a)(1985); these Guidelines enumerated types of workplace conduct which might be 
actionable: “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature.” 
 159. Moser, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 418. 
 160. Id. at 422. 
 161. 202 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 162. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 931. 
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unwelcome attention by a GMC employee which culminated in her 
resignation.163 
Two weeks after she began working at GMC, this employee requested an 
off-site meeting with her at a restaurant and propositioned her, requesting a 
relationship.164  Ms. Duncan rebuffed him and left the restaurant; he later 
apologized for his behavior and made no further propositions.165  However, Ms. 
Duncan stated that thereafter his behavior towards her became hostile and he 
was more critical of her work.166  She also testified about numerous incidents of 
inappropriate behavior: the employee asked Ms. Duncan to use his computer to 
create a training document, and had a picture of a naked woman on his screen-
saver; on four or five occasions, he unnecessarily touched her hand when she 
gave him the telephone; in 1995, in response to a request for a pay raise and 
consideration for an illustrator’s position (even though other applicants for the 
position had been required to draw automotive parts), he required her to draw a 
planter he kept in his office which was shaped like a slouched man wearing a 
sombrero, with a hole in the front of the man’s pants that allowed a cactus to 
protrude;167 also in 1995, he and a college employee posted on a bulletin board in 
the high-tech area a “recruitment” poster portraying Ms. Duncan as the 
president and CEO of the Man Hater’s Club of America;168 in April, 1996, he and 
a college employee arranged to have Ms. Duncan “arrested” at the company as 
part of a charity event, but once the employee paid for her “release,” and despite 
her protestations, the employee took Ms. Duncan to a bar; and, in May, 1997, he 
asked Ms. Duncan to type a draft of the beliefs of the “He-Men Women Hater’s 
Club,”169 but she refused and resigned two days later.170 
A jury found for Ms. Duncan on her claims of sexual harassment and 
constructive discharge.171  The Eighth Circuit reversed.172  The court cited the 
Harris factors, but failed to apply them or synthesize them with the guidance 
from the other Supreme Court cases to meaningfully evaluate the conduct.173  
 
 163. Id. at 930. 
 164. Id. at 931. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  Ms. Duncan admitted that the employee often directed criticisms at others as well, 
including her male co-workers. 
 167. Id. at 932.  Ms. Duncan later learned that she was not qualified for the position because she 
did not have a college degree. 
 168. Id. (summarizing evidence that the poster listed the membership qualifications as: “Must 
always be in control of: (1) Checking, Savings, all loose change, etc.; (2) (Ugh) Sex; (3) Raising 
children our way!; (4) Men must always do household chores; (5) Consider T.V. Dinners a gourmet 
meal”). 
 169. Id.  Plaintiff was asked to type the beliefs of this club, quoted by the court as including: 
“Constitutional Amendment, the 19th, giving women [the] right to vote should be repealed.  Real He-
Men indulge in a lifestyle of cursing, using tools, handling guns, driving trucks, hunting and of 
course, drinking beer.  Women really do have coodies [sic] and they can spread.  Women [are] the 
cause of 99.9 per cent of stress in men.  Sperm has a right to live.  All great chiefs of the world are 
men.  Prostitution should be legalized.” 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 933. 
 172. Id. at 931. 
 173. Id. at 934. 
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The court stated that “Title VII is ‘not designed to purge the workplace of 
vulgarity,’” quoting from Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co, a Seventh Circuit case,174 
but Baskerville was decided before Oncale and Faragher, and those cases do not 
make as sweeping a statement about the purpose of Title VII.  Rather, the 
Supreme Court cautioned that Title VII is not to be imposed as a general civility 
code,175 which is narrower than the characterization in Baskerville. 
Earlier in the opinion, the court had stated that the conduct was not so 
severe or pervasive as to alter a term, condition, or privilege of the plaintiff’s 
employment; “[t]o clear the high threshold of actionable harm” plaintiff had to 
show that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule, and insult,” citing Harris.176  In order to explain this conclusion, the 
court attempted to compare these facts to those in other cases, primarily from 
other circuits.177  However, it did so by merely stating that “[n]umerous cases 
have rejected hostile work environment claims premised upon facts equally or 
more egregious than the conduct at issue here.”178 
The court concluded its discussion by imposing standards of its own, with 
no citation or reference to any Supreme Court or other court language.179  It 
stated that the employee’s actions were “boorish, chauvinistic, and decidedly 
immature,” but did not create an objectively hostile work environment 
permeated with sexual harassment.180  The court selectively related “four 
categories” of conduct presented by plaintiff’s evidence, omitting, without 
explanation, the charity arrest incident and the evidence of hostility and 
criticism following the rebuffed request for a relationship.181  The court then 
dismissively characterized the other incidents as: “a single request for a 
relationship, which was not repeated when she rebuffed it, four or five isolated 
incidents of [the employee] briefly touching her hand, a request to draw a 
planter, and teasing in the form of a poster and beliefs for an imaginary club.”182 
The court returned to the subjective test, stating that it was apparent that 
the conduct made the plaintiff uncomfortable, before concluding that the 
conduct “did not meet the standard necessary for actionable sexual 
harassment.”183 
The dissent skillfully identified some of these shortcomings of the majority 
opinion’s disposition of this case.184  Judge Arnold found the jury’s 
determination reasonable and supported by ample evidence; throughout his 
discussion he recognized appropriate inferences that the jury could have drawn 
 
 174. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934. 
 175. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 
 176. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 935. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Earlier the court stated that GMC conceded that “these ten incidents could arguably be 
based on sex,” citing all but the charity event.  Id. at 933−34. 
 182. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 935. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 936–37. 
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to support its verdict, 185 and noted, quoting circuit precedent, that because there 
“‘is no bright line between sexual harassment and merely unpleasant 
conduct, . . . a jury’s decision must generally stand unless there is trial error.”186 
This conduct was not ordinary socializing, reflecting genuine but 
innocuous ways in which men and women routinely interact with members of 
the opposite sex; the conduct, as recognized by Judge Arnold, went far beyond 
gender related jokes and occasional teasing.187 
A more meaningful evaluation of the conduct to determine if the jury 
properly could have considered it severe would have applied the Supreme 
Court analysis.  Doing so could have led to a conclusion that it was severe 
because it consisted of a request for a sexual relationship, and hostility based on 
sex.  Judge Arnold characterized the proposition as a “sexual advance by her 
supervisor within days of beginning her job,” occurring during work hours and 
constituting a direct request for a sexual relationship.188  He further recognized 
that in the following months, the supervisor’s conduct became hostile, 
consisting of increased criticism of plaintiff’s work and degradation of her 
professional capabilities in front of her peers.189  He stated that there also were 
other forms of inappropriate behavior, including physical contacts; social 
humiliation; emotional intimidation (citing the touching of her hand, public 
humiliation, the requirement to draw a vulgar planter or not be considered for 
promotion); and specific tasks of a sexual nature (such as typing the club 
minutes).190 
Similarly, an application of the Supreme Court analysis to these facts 
logically would have supported the conclusion that a jury properly could have 
found that the conduct was pervasive.  Judge Arnold stated that Ms. Duncan 
was subjected to “a long series” of incidents of sexual harassment,191 and that the 
sexual overture was not an isolated one, but was the beginning of a string of 
degrading actions.192  From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably 
 
 185. Id. at 937.  Again, proper respect for a jury’s determination in these cases is a clear way to 
avoid inconsistent and confusing rulings by courts of appeals. 
 186. Id. at 938 (additional citation omitted).  He further quoted additional precedent that the 
determination of whether the conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in the hands of the jury 
(citation omitted). 
 187. Id., quoting Faragher and Oncale. 
 188. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 937. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 936. 
 192. Judge Arnold criticized the majority as minimizing the effect of the sexual proposition on 
Ms. Duncan’s working conditions by characterizing it as a “single request.” He also criticized the 
majority’s faulty reliance on other circuit court cases, declaring that the behavior to which Ms. 
Duncan was subjected was not “less severe” than conduct in some of the cases and he distinguished 
it from conduct in some other cases.  Id. at 937−38.  He noted, for example, that Ms. Duncan was 
given specific tasks of a sexually-charged nature; that she was subjected to conduct which would 
prevent her from succeeding in the workplace; that she was sexually propositioned; and that she 
was singled out – the conduct was directed specifically at her.  Id.  With regard to comparisons to 
cases within the Eighth Circuit, Judge Arnold asked: “Is it clear that the women in these cases 
suffered harassment greater than Ms. Duncan?”  He answered: “I think not.”  Id. at 938. 
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decided that the conduct was sufficiently persistent and regular, creating a 
cumulative effect and an expectation of repetition.193 
Thus, rather than applying the analytical guidance provided by the 
Supreme Court for the evaluation of conduct in these cases, and rather than 
properly deferring to the jury’s determination, the Eighth Circuit irrationally 
reversed. 
PART IV 
As demonstrated in Part III, a correct understanding and application of the 
Supreme Court reasoning and analysis would result in more consistent and 
appropriate outcomes in lower court decisions.  This would enable courts to 
distinguish “ordinary socializing” from “discriminatory conditions of 
employment.”194 
In this section we present the totality of circumstances test for determining 
whether conduct could be considered objectively severe or pervasive, based on a 
synthesis of the Supreme Court opinions.  This provides both a guide for judges 
in ruling on dispositive motions and model jury instructions.195 
A. General instructions regarding totality of circumstances test to determine if 
conduct could be considered severe or pervasive. 
Conduct which is either objectively severe or objectively pervasive, such 
that it alters the conditions of employment, creates a hostile work environment 
and violates Title VII.196 
Within the objective test to determine whether conduct was severe or 
pervasive, examine the record as a whole and the totality of circumstances, 
guided by common sense and sensitivity to social context in which the incidents 
occurred.197 
Consider the surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships 
which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the 
physical acts performed.198 
No single factor is required and this is not a mathematically precise test.199 
 
 193. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. 
 194. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. 
 195. Current model jury instructions may provide some guidance but fall into the same trap as 
the cases in terms of over-reliance on the Harris factors and/or misstatement of the law, including 
meshing of the subjective and objective tests.  See, e.g., 3C Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 171.40 (5th Ed.), 
 196. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
787; Clark, 536 U.S. at 270. 
 197. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.  This does not mandate different analyses depending on whether the 
conduct occurs in a blue or white collar environment.  See generally Shaffer, supra note 70 
(appropriately criticizing such a two-standard approach). 
 198. Id. at 81–82. 
 199. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. 
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B. Whether conduct could be considered severe. 
The nature of all the conduct should be analyzed to determine whether it 
contributed to an environment which reasonably could be considered hostile or 
abusive.200 
Most commonly, the claim of hostile work environment involves a number 
of acts and the claim is based on the cumulative effect of these individual acts,201 
although an extreme single act might be considered severe. 
There is no hierarchy of behavior, such that physical acts are to be 
considered more extreme than verbal conduct.202 
Conduct may be considered severe whether motivated by sexual desire 
and/or by hostility based on gender.203 
Conduct need not be criminal to be considered severe.204 
Conduct may be considered severe if it was either physically threatening or 
humiliating.205 
Conduct may be considered severe if it included: requests for sexual 
relations (explicit or implicit proposals for sexual activity206); actual sexual 
relations; fondling; pursuit;207 and/or unwelcome sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature.208 
Conduct which is objectively regarded as ordinary socializing in the 
workplace, such as intersexual flirtation, is not considered severe.209 
Conduct which objectively reflects innocuous differences in the ways men 
and women routinely interact with members of the opposite sex is not 
considered severe.210 
Conduct would not be considered severe if it consisted of a mere utterance 
of an offensive epithet;211 and/or merely if words used have sexual content or 
connotations.212 
Conduct would not be considered severe if it consisted merely of simple 
teasing, offhand comments and [isolated] incidents (unless extremely serious).213 
Ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as [sporadic] use of abusive 
language, gender-related jokes, and [occasional] teasing214 are not to be 
considered severe. 
 
 200. Id. at 22–23. 
 201. See Clark, 536 U.S. at 271, and Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. 
 202. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82. 
 203. Id. at 80. 
 204. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
 205. This is one of the Harris factors, 510 U.S. at 23. 
 206. See Oncale, 530 U.S. at 80. 
 207. See facts in Meritor, supra note 28, which the Court held were plainly sufficient to state a 
claim for hostile environment sexual harassment. 
 208. EEOC Guidelines (1980), cited in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. 
 209. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. 
 212. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
 213. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Clark, 532 U.S. at 271. 
 214. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 
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C. Whether conduct could be considered pervasive. 
Conduct which permeated the workplace with discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule, and insult is pervasive and creates a hostile work environment in 
violation of Title VII. 215 
Offensive conduct which is frequent216 may be considered pervasive.  
Frequency may be determined by examining how many times the acts 
occurred,217 as well as the regularity, repetition or pattern of the offensive 
conduct within the duration of the victim’s employment.218 
It is appropriate to consider where and when conduct occurred, within 
and/or outside the workplace,219 because conduct which was inescapable, or 
unavoidable, and/or occurring in various locations, can contribute to a finding 
that it was pervasive.220 
It also is appropriate to consider how long the conduct persisted and with 
what degree of regularity or repetition, to decide if it created an expectation 
and/or a cumulative effect.221  222 
Conduct which is merely “isolated, sporadic, or occasional,”223 such that it 
did not permeate the workplace with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and 
insult, is not pervasive. 
CONCLUSION 
The reasoning provided by the Supreme Court in the sexual harassment 
cases offers more guidance to lower courts than they have recognized.  Instead, 
federal district courts and circuit courts of appeals frequently rely on other 
lower court decisions that have ignored the Supreme Court reasoning; and, to a 
large extent, the lower courts have applied their own notions of acceptable 
workplace behavior.  This has resulted in unjust and inconsistent dispositions. 
All parties in these lawsuits deserve adjudications in which the legal 
standards are applied consistently, which could be achieved by more direct and 
 
 215. See Harris, 519 U.S. at 21. 
 216. The definition of frequent: “happening at short intervals, often repeated or occurring”, 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, www.m-w.com/dictionary/frequent (last visited Dec. 29, 
2007). 
 217. See Schnapper, discussed supra note 82. 
 218. The Court noted that the offensive conduct continued for four years in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 
60, and that the objectionable behavior occurred repeatedly and frequently for the part-time and 
summer employees from 1985−1990 in Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780–84; See Harris, 510 U.S. at 19. 
 219. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60–61. 
 220. See Schnapper, discussed supra note 82. 
 221. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. 
 222. The level of offensiveness of the conduct needs to be considered when determining if the 
conduct was pervasive, but the threshold may be lower than that imposed when the court is 
analyzing whether the conduct was severe, as suggested by commentators discussing the inverse 
analysis.  See Pellicotti, supra note 12.  However, the determination of whether conduct was severe or 
pervasive requires independent inquiries; conduct does not have to be severe to be pervasive nor 
pervasive to be severe; both inquiries require a review of the totality of circumstances.  This 
approach is derived from the reasoning of the Supreme Court cases and a synthesis of the Harris 
factors with that reasoning. 
 223. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Clark, 532 U.S. at 271. 
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explicit application of the Supreme Court’s analysis.  The failure to do so has 
resulted in courts’ lack of appreciation for the vast array of discriminatory and 
hostile conduct that lies just beyond the genuine differences in the ways men 
and women routinely interact with members of the opposite sex.224 
Repeated warnings throughout the Supreme Court cases that isolated 
incidents of offensive conduct, sporadic use of gender-related jokes, or 
occasional teasing does not result in Title VII liability, provide sufficient 
guidance to prevent the statute from being used as a federally imposed civility 
code.225  Attempting to grab a co-workers breast; explicitly propositioning the 
plaintiff for sex; forcing a plaintiff as part of her job assignment to draw a 
phallus; commenting on explicit intimate parts of the plaintiff’s body; a steady 
stream of sexualized comments and acts directed at the plaintiff throughout her 
employment226—such conduct should be presented to a fact-finder for a 
reasonable determination of its severity or pervasiveness.  The fact-finder 
should apply the synthesis of the Supreme Court’s reasoning to the conduct to 
determine if it violates Title VII, and appellate courts should exercise restraint in 
respecting the fact-finders’ determinations.  Such a process is necessary as these 
cases are fact intensive, and require an evaluation of the totality of 
circumstances and the cumulative effect of individual acts.227  Proper application 
of the Supreme Court’s analysis would ensure that courts uphold “Title VII’s 
broad rule of workplace equality.”228 
 
 224. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. 
 225. See id.; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 
 226. See facts in cases discussed in Part III. 
 227. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. 
 228. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
